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Abstract 
In the contemporary or so-called “post-2012” period of climate governance, the 
question of what a new future climate agreement might entail has arisen in 
conjunction with the initiation of negotiations on the Durban Platform on 
Enhanced Action in the climate regime. In parallel to this, larger states, industrial 
countries as well as developing countries are now dominating the UNFCCC 
process, seeking other ways of realizing their national climate policy, and 
pursuing negotiations on other governance arrangements. A key issue in this 
changing situation is how the responsibility for mitigation among developing 
countries is perceived. Do developing country conceptualizations of responsibility 
correspond to how this important issue is conceptualized within contemporary 
theories of climate governance? By performing an ideal type analysis, the 
conception of this responsibility within a select group of climate governance 
theories was elucidated and compared with how the question of responsibility was 
expressed in a number of important policy documents formulated by major 
developing countries in connection to the negotiations within the Ad-Hoc 
Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action. The investigation 
concluded that a) there is a subtle correspondence between Neoliberal-
Institutionalists and Developing Countries in regards to the role of the state as the 
basis of responsibility, b) there is a subtle correspondence between Green Critical 
International Political Economy perspectives and Neoliberal-Institutionalists in 
regard to the importance of restructuring the UNFCCC, and lastly c) that the 
question of developing country responsibility in the climate regime reveals that 
climate governance is inseparable from climate politics: 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and Problem Description 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
constitutes the most important entity in the climate regime and exemplifies the most 
concerted effort by states to attempt to cooperate in finding solutions to Climate 
Change. From its adoption in 1992 the UNFCCC has however met with 
considerable obstacles along its 21-year trajectory and the relation between 
Industrialized Countries (ICs) and Developing Countries (DCs) has been of critical 
importance in this regard. During the Conference of the Parties COP 18 in Doha in 
2012 the only encompassing legal document that negotiations in the UNFCCC have 
produced, the Kyoto Protocol, entered into its second commitment period, also 
known as the post-2012 period. Currently, however it is widely acknowledged that 
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol that have renewed their commitments will only 
cover approximately 15% of global emissions.  
What is becoming evidently clear is that there is no way that the UNFCCC will 
achieve its ultimate objective of a “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system.”(UNFCCC.Art.2) if large Developing Countries (DCs) do 
not agree to mitigate their emissions. It is concluded by notable authors within 
political science that: “No climate regime can succeed without finding ways to 
persuade the major non-Annex 1 countries (e.g. China, India, Brazil, Indonesia) to 
accept the need to cap and then to reduce emissions sharply over time.” (Young, 
2011:630). As well as within natural science disciplines: “The implication is 
indisputable: no climate regime can be effective if it does not bring about 
considerable mitigation activity in the South.” (Kartha, 2011:512).  
During the Durban COP in 2011, Parties to the convention decided to “to launch 
a process to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with 
legal force under the Convention applicable to all 
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Parties.”(FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1). However the precise meaning of this 
formulation is still not clear. What is clear is that the potential impacts of climate 
change on developing countries are truly severe as is evidenced in the Human 
Development Report from 2013.With respect to Development Studies; the question 
of Climate Change is highly relevant. 
With respect to how this is addressed in political science, the field of climate 
governance theory describes a fragmentation within the governance architecture of 
the climate regimes (Zelli, 2011). A brief further inquiry into the field reveals that 
“…there is hardly any coherent, systematic, structured system of global 
environmental governance.” (Biermann & Pattberg, 2012).  
Hence, the question of DC responsibility for mitigation emerges in connection to 
that of the current status of climate governance. How is the question of DC 
responsibility for mitigation treated in the theoretical literature? What can be 
understood about the connections between DC responsibility and climate 
governance in political science theory? In addition to these questions, it would 
appear that the question of how DCs themselves regard their responsibility for 
mitigation is relevant bearing in mind that most indications state that Climate 
Change carries with it such potentially disastrous consequences. Are there any 
similarities or differences between these two conceptualizations? And if so how can 
they be characterized?  
1.2 Research Question 
In regard to the previous introduction my overarching Research question is the 
following: How do theories of climate governance conceptualize Developing 
Country Responsibility? 
I have chosen to break this main research question into two sub questions: 
a) How do climate governance theories conceptualize developing country 
responsibility? 
b) How do developing countries conceptualize their responsibility? 
I will restate the research question and its affiliate sub-questions in the end of 
chapter 2 section 4.  
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1.3 Aims and Structure 
Bearing in mind the descriptive character of the above stated research questions, 
the aim of this thesis is to attempt to clarify multiple theoretical attempts to 
conceptualize DC responsibility within the realm of climate governance and to 
create an ideational model through which to clarify the various positions as well 
as clarify what the underlying basis for differences may consist of.  
The structure of the thesis is as follows; it begins in chapter 2 with a literature 
review that broadly examines the concept of responsibility with specific regard to 
developing countries in the UNFCCC. At the end of this chapter the research 
question is restated in light of the findings of the literature review and two key 
thematic aspects that have been extrapolated from the literature.  
Following the restated research question, chapter 3 addresses the theoretical 
positioning of this thesis in more detail.  
In Chapter 4 the choice of method and its connection to the stated research 
aims are described in more detail, including the delimitations of materials and 
documents that will be used.  
In Chapter 5 the first restated sub-question is answered through an extensive 
theoretical exposition of firstly, climate governance theories relationship to 
international relations theory as well as the role of the state. Secondly in chapter 5, 
the concept of responsibility in climate governance is explicated following the two 
key aspects that emerged in chapter 2. Thirdly in chapter 5 climate governance 
theory and developing country responsibility are discussed in relation and the 
ideal types of climate governance are exemplified with reference to a current 
debate within climate governance concerning the concept of minilateralism.  
Lastly in chapter 5 an ideal-type model of how two broad types of climate 
governance theories differentiate in relation to how the key aspects of developing 
country responsibility are conceptualized and in relation to how the two types 
differentiate in relation to the concept of minilateralism. 
In Chapter 6 an analysis is performed on two key policy documents that have 
emerged within the UNFCCC negotiations on a possible new climate agreement. 
In the first section the documents are explained in accordance to how they have 
come about through the use of a paper trail. In the second section the content of 
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the documents are reported and then analyzed in regard to how the content 
articulates a conceptualization of developing country responsibility.  
Lastly the content of the policy documents is presented in an ideal type model 
that is identical in structure to the model from chapter 5.In the conclusions in 
chapter 7 the two models are presented and analyzed in conjunction and the 
correspondences are commented. Lastly the findings of the model are discussed 
and reflected upon. 
1.4 Theoretical Positioning 
The purpose is not to describe in any detail the actual climate policies in the 
proposals or methodologies employed when climate policy is formed. The objects 
of this thesis are the content of the governance theories as well as the content of 
documents that articulate developing country views, both in regard to how they 
conceptualize responsibility.  
Due to the fact that what I am inquiring into are ideas my theoretical 
positioning with respect to this thesis is Constructivism, which I will describe, in 
greater detail in chapter 3. I will also be addressing my aims in greater detail in 
Chapter 3 and 4.  
1.5 Methods 
My choice of methods in this thesis is that of a content oriented ideational 
analysis. In terms of my materials I will also employ elements of qualitative text 
analysis. In terms of how the content of texts are analyzed I will make use of an 
ideal-type analytical tool that is commonly used in order to systematically 
organize content and is thus commensurate with my stated aims.   
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2 Literature Review 
This chapter provides a review of research that examines the concept of 
responsibility in the UNFCCC in specific regard to developing country parties. I 
will first describe the aims of my review, the type of literature I have selected, and 
the methodologies these sources employ. Secondly, I will describe various 
thematic tendencies that I have been able to extrapolate from the literature and 
thirdly, I will present the findings I have derived from these themes. Lastly I will 
specify my research question in light of these findings.  
2.1 Review Aims, Types of Literature and 
Methods in Literature 
Research fields that address the problem of climate change, are numerous and 
varied. I have selected literature from International Environmental Law, Global 
Environmental Politics/Governance as well as affiliated International Relations 
disciplines such as International Political Economy. The research reviewed 
employs various methods and theoretical explanations. Most of the material I have 
selected is of political science orientation and include both documentary analysis 
and interviews with key informants that are most often delegates or 
representatives engaged in UNFCCC negotiations.  
The scope and scale of analysis of the literature is a possible limitation due to 
the fact that I have selected literature from multiple research fields. I consider this 
limitation acceptable, however, given the broad ideational concept that I am 
seeking to examine. The review aims to synthesize scholarly accounts and seeks 
to extrapolate meta themes that transcend the academic disciplines of these 
scholarly accounts. 
When attempting to examine the concept of DC responsibility within the 
confines of the UNFCCC, the principle of Common But Differentiated 
Responsibilities (CBDR) stands out as key. The UNFCCC in its entirety is even 
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defined by some authors as being “attempts to operationalize the principle of 
CBDR” (Bushey & Jinna, 2010:1). The first time that CBDR is clearly enunciated 
as a principle with respect to climate change is in connection with the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) known as the Rio 
Summit in 1992. CBDR was included as principle 7 of the Rio Declaration as well 
as in the preamble and Article 3.1 and 4 in the UNFCCC, which was adopted in 
conjunction with the Rio Summit (Rajamani, 2000).  
2.2 Themes 
The thematic tendencies that I have found when reviewing the literature and 
which are significant for the purposes and aims of this essay are the following; a) 
ambiguity regarding the nature of responsibilities in the climate regime; b) 
changes in composition of southern coalitions within the negotiations of the 
UNFCCC and lastly; c) a change in orientation regarding DC responsibilities in 
the recent period of negotiations, especially following COP 17 in Durban in 2011 
and leading up to the present day. 
2.2.1 Ambiguity regarding the nature of responsibilities 
Regarding what responsibilities that the CBDR principle refers to, the literature 
contains numerous references to conflicting emphasis by parties to the UNFCCC 
when they attempt to interpret CBDR. Despite the fact that the UNFCCC contains 
other principles that pertain to questions of “equity” or “burden-sharing”, CBDR 
stands out in the literature as the most politically relevant, it is even claimed that 
the CBDR is “the ethical anchor of the Climate Regime” (Rajamani, 2000:130).  
CBDR unavoidably includes an acknowledgement of historical responsibilities, 
which in the case of the UNFCCC means historical emissions or contributions to 
environmental degradation and this is also expressed in both the Berlin Mandate 
from 1995 and the Bali Action Plan from 2007 and represents a central point of 
contention in the entire lifecycle of the UNFCCC. This contention is embedded in 
the CBDR insofar that there is a shifting degree of emphasis between historical 
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responsibility as a form of Culpability and responsibility for implementation of 
the convention that is derived from Capability. 
Capability in the case of UNFCCC is understood to mean economic and 
technological capacity (Okerere, 2008 and Rajamani, 2000). An examination of 
the genealogy of equity norms that underlie the CBDR principle reveals that the 
tension between Culpability and Capability as denoting the nature of 
responsibilities in CBDR runs parallel to how ICs and DCs have interpreted them 
in the contexts in which CBDR has figured, especially in the UNFCCC (Okerere, 
2008). A number of factors determine differences among parties in their 
interpretation of the concept. These factors include the extent to which it is 
possible to establish causality in regard to emissions, and most importantly to 
what extent the norms fit with the neoliberal economic order. It would appear that 
one kind of interpretation of CBDR stands in a polemic relationship to the manner 
in which neoliberal perspectives on climate change conceive of DC responsibility. 
This leads one to query how a Neoliberal international relations theory of climate 
governance would conceptualize DC responsibility. Indeed it raises the questions:  
how does any political theory of climate governance conceptualizes DC 
responsibility and are there differences between theories in this regard? 
In addition, a major underlying conflict in the UNFCCC in regard to what 
“responsibilities” mean in the context of CBDR stems from differing 
understanding of the actual object of responsibilities. Some researchers claim that 
the Climate Regime has become subsumed within a broader development 
discourse, which prioritizes responsibility for economic growth and poverty 
eradication rather than for environmental concerns (Vlassopoulos, 2012). That DC 
participation in the UNFCCC is motivated by development concerns is 
unequivocal and this is incorporated in Article 4.7 of the Convention itself. In 
regards to how DCs have viewed responsibility, it is equally clear that the 
inclusion of CBDR in the UNFCCC was seen a necessary counterbalance to an 
inequitable world order (Gupta, 1997) (Najam, 2004) (Miguez, 2002). For DCs, 
CBDR is to be understood as a critical principle subsumed within the concept of 
sustainable development. This framing under the broader rubrique of sustainable 
development means that the South views the negotiations within the UNFCCC 
potentially as a positive sum game. Simultaneously however, from the perspective 
of the South, the CBDR principle has been steadily eroding thus hindering the 
  8 
progress of the UNFCCC (Najam, 2004). This theme confirms that the way in 
which the relationship between development and climate is considered within the 
concept of SD also has relevance for how DC parties view their responsibilities in 
light of interpretations of the CBDR principle. The concept of responsibility for 
DCs is thus intimately interwoven with how the relationship between 
development and climate is to be understood.  
2.2.2 Southern coalitions old and new 
The significance of DC coalitions and their effect on the Climate Regime is 
evident from the literature. The two main coalitions that stand out are the G77 + 
China and the BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), which was 
formed during the COP 15 in Copenhagen of 2009. These two coalitions are 
representative of both the old and the new, of a coalition that predates the 
UNFCCC and one that emerged within the Climate Regime. The G77 coalition 
played a considerable part in advancing DCs concerns in both the formation and 
adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992. The significance of the G77 continued in 
advancing the development focus of the regime itself by way of inclusion of the 
CBDR principle and the deriving framework of non-requirement of mitigation to 
non-annex parties as was formulated in the UNFCCC and in case of the Kyoto 
Protocol (Kasa et al, 2008; Vihma et al, 2011; and Rajamani, 2008).  
The formation of the BASIC coalition is equally important in the most recent 
period of climate negotiations post Copenhagen 2009 and many conclude that this 
emblematic of a new multipolar world that is reflected within the sphere of the 
UNFCCC (Hochstetler, 2012; Roberts, 2011; Saran, 2011; and Qi, 2009). 
Especially China and India are described as employing a consistent strategy of 
minimizing their obligations. However these countries also face critical challenges 
associated with climate change and have therefore engaged in negotiations on 
numerous bilateral and regional governance arrangements as well as national 
plans to address these challenges (Walsh et al, 2011; Wu, 2012; Bortscheller, 
2010; Delman, 2011; Huffbauer & Kim, 2011; and Christoff, 2010).  
Despite the fact that DC states operate in accordance with their interests and 
employ strategies derived from these, there is also indication of genuine 
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substantive concern with the ethical aspects of how the UNFCCC is constituted 
Thus it is not the case that the way in which CBDR has been invoked by DC 
parties is exclusively motivated by instrumental concerns (Stalley, 2013). This 
raises the question of how DCs, especially China and India, currently view their 
responsibilities with respect to climate change How do these countries 
conceptualize their responsibilities, especially bearing in mind the ambiguous 
nature of the concept and with respect to how they conceive of the relationship 
between development and climate? 
2.2.3 Changes in orientation regarding DC responsibilities 
While the Kyoto Protocol constituted a peak instance of an earlier CBDR 
interpretation in which the distribution of responsibilities appeared more cleanly 
defined along the IC-DC or North-South line, the COP 15 in Copenhagen of 2009 
is considered as the peak instance of an attempted change in the differentiation of 
DC parties to the UNFCCC resulting in a blockage to the multilateral process 
(Bushey & Jinnah, 2010 and Christoff, 2010). What is apparent is that the COP 15 
outcome represents a change from the earlier UNFCCC trajectory to one that is 
characterized by an increasing balance of power as well as an increasing 
parallelism. The larger states, both ICs and DCs, are now dominating the 
UNFCCC process, seeking other ways of realizing their national climate policy, 
and pursuing negotiations on other governance arrangements (Christoff, 2010 and 
Wagner, Hajjar & Appleton, 2013). 
The post 2012 period refers to the ending of the first commitment phase for 
parties to the Kyoto Protocol and with respect to CBDR, this period is claimed to 
be characterized by is a dilution of the concept of differentiation as it was earlier 
conceived of in regard to CBDR (Deluil, 2012). The earlier differentiation regime 
that favored DCs is claimed to be slowly replaced by a flexibility regime 
exemplified by the Durban platform of 2011 that contains a stated goal of 
achieving a legally binding climate agreement that is applicable to all by 2015 
(Ibid). This marks a major change in the understanding of CBDR since Kyoto, 
namely that all parties to the UNFCCC are ascribed some responsibility for 
mitigation (Maguire, 2012). However, if the role of CBDR is changing, one can 
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ask what will characterize the kind of differential treatment in the UNFCCC, and 
if CBDR will continue to play the same role as before? 
2.3 Findings 
According to the literature reviewed, the specific interpretation of CBDR that 
prioritizes its initial formulation as expressed in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol, i.e. that DCs should not be ascribed responsibilities for mitigation, is 
claimed to be slowly being diluted. A shift is claimed to have occurred in favor of 
an interpretation that reflects the growing importance and relevance of large DC 
states, particularly the BASIC group. This interpretation of CBDR is emblematic 
of an interpretation which prioritizes capability over culpability in so far that it 
derives from a view of large developing parties such as China and India as 
becoming capable of more stringent mitigation.   
The literature also indicates, however, that for the DCs the concept of 
responsibility and its manifestation in the CBDR principle has been a way of 
establishing a Climate Regime that conforms to specific norms that emphasize 
culpability. Furthermore, from the perspective of DCs, the initial shared 
understanding that the CBDR is subsumed under sustainable development 
remains consistent. Thus, for DCs the question of responsibility is related to the 
relation between development and climate. In addition, a contemporary 
negotiation on a legally binding agreement that is potentially applicable to all 
raises the question of how DC responsibilities will be characterized in such an 
agreement. 
2.4 Specification of Research Question 
In light of these findings, a relevant question is whether DC conceptualizations of 
responsibility correspond to how theories of climate governance conceptualize DC 
responsibility.  
Is there a difference between the way climate governance theories and the way 
DCs such as China and India, conceptualize responsibility with respect to: 
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a) The nature of responsibilities 
And 
b) The relationship between development and climate? 
Since mitigation has previously been the main issue of contention I will focus 
only on responsibility as it relates to mitigation within the climate regime. 
This restated research question indicates two things: that what is to be inquired 
into are ideas and concepts and that the source material for these will require texts 
to be able to be answered. I will address these two matters in the next chapters that 
concern theoretical positioning and methods respectively. 
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3 Theoretical Positioning 
This thesis is theoretically situated within the metatheory of constructivism, which 
is related and yet also distinct from a constructivist theory of international 
relations (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010). Constructivism is thus both a theory of 
international relations and an approach to social theory (Fierke, 2010). This 
theoretical position is in line with my research question in that the latter seeks to 
examine how responsibility as an ideational category is articulated within on the 
one hand theoretical accounts of Climate Governance and by actual DC actors on 
the other. 
Constructivism assumes that ideational dimensions can and do affect causal 
change in so far as norms can affect behavior but also in so far as norms 
contribute to the constitution of the identity of actors (Fierke, 2010). Most 
importantly for the purposes of this thesis, constructivism identifies the reflexive 
quality of interpretation that is involved in how actors actually behave (Paterson, 
2006). It can even be said that actors must engage in interpretation in order to act 
at all (Hay, 2002). Constructivism views ideas as performing a mediating role 
between structures and agents and are thus understood to contribute to political 
change (Ibid).  An important element of constructivism that serves my research 
question well concerns a critique of rationalist explanations of behavior within the 
realm of international relations and the question of social cognition (Paterson, 
2006 and Fierke, 2010). I am interested in providing a descriptive account of the 
possible difference between how various theories of climate governance 
conceptualize DC responsibility and how DCs conceptualize their responsibility. 
Constructivism is therefore suitable as a theoretical perspective in so far that it 
acknowledges the process of interpretation that is active with respect to how 
responsibility is conceptualized. 
This account will be borrowing a constructivism theoretical lens, the elements 
of which are described and elaborated on in Pettenger, 2007. This approach 
assumes an interdependence between material and ideational forces and enables 
an examination of “...how material realities gain meaning through social 
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interaction” (Pettenger, 2007:6). Following this constructivism framework, my 
theoretical inquiry takes the shape of a norm-centered type of inquiry in which 
“…these studies seek to explain how and why actors define and instantiate 
particular norms” (Pettenger, 2007:10). My inquiry will mainly consist of a 
descriptive account that provides an answer to the question of how responsibility 
is conceptualized. Since what I am interested in examining in this thesis is the 
conceptualization of responsibility, the main focus of my inquiry will concern the 
content of this ideational category. This means in turn that it will be a 
fundamentally qualitative inquiry.  
It is not a self-evident that a choice of a theoretical approach automatically 
associates with a choice of methodology or an epistemological perspective 
(Hochstetler & Lautari, 2006). However, as I will describe in greater detail in my 
methods chapter, there are some associative links between constructivism and 
particular methodological approaches of which I will make use of in this thesis. 
These concern the fact that my choice of methods is that of an ideational analysis 
which bears some similarities with constructivism’s focus on the role of ideas and 
norms. 
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4 Methods 
The following chapter is divided into three segments. First, I will describe and 
justify my choice of method. Thereafter I will describe and elaborate the benefits 
and limitations of my choice of analytical tool. Lastly, I will indicate the materials 
and delimitations that I will employ and provide the justification for this decision. 
4.1 Methods 
Given that my inquiry will be an examination of broad and abstract theoretical 
categories, my choice of method will be that of an ideational analysis, a collective 
term denoting a combination of aims, research questions and methodological 
tools. What is most characteristic of this methodological approach concerns not 
only how it can be used, but also primarily what it can be used to examine 
(Beckman, 2007). Since the objects of my inquiry are conceptualizations of 
responsibility, which are ideational categories, an ideational analysis is suitable 
for this inquiry.  
My aim will be to describe ideational content and will thus be centered on the 
content of the idea itself rather than their performative function (Beckman, 2007 
and Bergström & Boreus, 2005). Specifically my aims are to clarify and provide a 
more systematic account of whether or not there is a correspondence between 
theoretical conceptualizations of DC responsibility and conceptualizations that are 
articulated by DCs themselves. Following this, the aim is to organize and classify 
the content of these conceptualizations (Esaiasson et al, 2012). As a descriptive 
analysis however, it is not sufficient to only reference this content but also 
necessary to relate the two conceptualizations along a point of comparison. This 
process requires an operationalization of the conceptualizations and in case of this 
thesis the operationalization takes the shape of two aspects of responsibility that I 
have extrapolated from my review, namely the nature of responsibilities and the 
relationship between development and climate.  
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4.2 Analytical Tool: Ideal type 
When performing an ideational analysis it is required to choose an analytical tool 
with which to analyze. For the purposes of this thesis I have selected the tool 
ideal-type which can be defined as follows: “…it is a deliberate over-
simplification of a complex empirical actuality for the purpose of highlighting 
certain themes or aspects that are never as clear in the actual world as they are in 
the ideal-type depiction of it.” (Weber, 1999a; 191 in Thaddeus-Jackson, 
2011:37). 
The benefit of an ideal-type is that it can bring a certain order to a certain 
material and that it potentially may enable comparisons (Bergström&Boreus, 
2005). While an ideal-type does not correspond to an actuality there are still some 
methodological criteria that should be met. Following the aims described in the 
former section, the ideal-type is used to organize content. In regard to 
operationalization of concepts it is required that types contain elements that are 
comparable to actualities and, furthermore that components in an ideal-type 
model are substantially different and mutually exclusive to the degree that it is 
possible to at least identify some form of difference. With regard to my restated 
research question in the previous chapter what I am comparing in terms of 
difference is the way which DC responsibility for mitigation is conceptualized in 
climate governance theories and by DCs themselves.  
While the main criteria on which to judge an ideal-type analysis is its 
usefulness the question of validity is still relevant in so far as the model that is 
produced must not define the material that is to be analyzed (Bergström&Boreus, 
2005). This also relates to the points in the previous section regarding that a 
description is not sufficient in itself to count as an actual inference. The entire 
point of selecting an analytical tool is to enable inference. Given that my source of 
materials will be texts the question of validity is relatable to the ideal-type tool in 
that the questions that one poses to the texts should be relevant empirical 
indicators of the phenomenon that one is interested in examining (Esaiasson et al, 
2012). 
‘ 
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4.3 Delimitations and Materials 
When studying the content of ideational categories, one is often compelled to 
study texts. This thesis employs a qualitative text analysis of the contents of these 
texts with the purpose of systematically ordering them in accordance with the 
ideal type analytical tool. When delimiting what choices of texts I will utilize I am 
thus considering their content as the main criteria for selection and I am both 
selecting according to their domain and what actor they are associated with 
(Halperin & Heath, 2012). 
With regard to texts it is clear that they must be identified and selected in terms 
of their relevance to the actual research aims and question. For the purpose of this 
thesis, texts will be of two kinds; peer reviewed academic articles, edited volumes 
and books within the research field of Climate Governance and formal policy 
documents that are produced within the domain of the UNFCCC negotiations. 
There is support for the fact that, with respect to the use of qualitative methods to 
study processes of politics, documents are useful sources of data (Hochstetler & 
Laituri, 2006).   
With respect to the first kind of text I have selected my material through 
searching for keywords that include “Climate Governance” “Developing Country” 
and “Responsibility” using databases and other channels available through being a 
student at Lunds University. The authors and researchers that I have selected 
literature by and which I cite are all established and notable in their respective 
fields. The Journals that I have selected this material from include amongst others: 
Global Environmental Politics, Perspectives on Politics and Sustainable 
Development Law & Policy. 
As regards the second kind of texts, namely policy documents from the 
UNFCCC, the selection is made in regard to both which actors that have authored 
them, the domain in which they figure and most especially the formalized process 
that has generated them. What is especially true for policy documents of this kind 
is that they refer to other domains within the negotiations and other documents. I 
intend to present and clarify these relations when necessary in a “Paper Trail” 
(Atkinson&Coffey, 2004). This is done in chapter 6 section 1. The policy 
documents I have selected are two formal submissions from China and India to 
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the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action or 
AWG-ADP. The AWG-ADP is a subsidiary body to the UNFCCC that is tasked 
with negotiating on a new agreement within the climate regime that is stated to be 
“applicable to all parties” and is thus relevant with respect to the research 
questions restated in the end of chapter 2. Both policy documents that I have 
analyzed including are included in their entirety within the Appendix section as 
well as some related documents such as an excerpt from the main report document 
COP 17 meeting in Durban in 2011. 
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5 Climate Governance and 
Developing Country Responsibility 
In this chapter I will begin in the first segment by pursuing a theoretical inquiry 
into the field of Climate Governance and elaborate how it may be related to 
International Relations theory. I will then focus in on the question of the role of 
the state and its connection to the question of responsibility. In the second section 
I will elaborate further on two aspects of DC responsibility in light of the previous 
section, and will describe how these aspects are problematized and elaborated in 
the literature. Following this I will describe a contemporary debate on the 
composition of the UNFCCC that holds fundamental relevance in regard to the 
most current climate negotiations and the question of DC responsibility. 
Following this I will, in the third section, construct an ideal type model of two 
broad categories of Climate Governance theories that first differentiate in regard 
to how the state can be figured as well as the status of the Climate Regime.  I will 
then describe how these two categories differentiate in regard to the question of 
responsibility. That is, how they conceptually relate to the two aspects of 
responsibility previously noted. This will be presented as a table in order for the 
reader to be able to see a clear representation. 
5.1 Theories of Climate Governance and 
International Relations 
Climate Governance is a comparatively difficult field to actually systematically 
approach with respect to classifying distinct theoretical perspectives. The reasons 
for this partly derive from how Climate Governance is situated within the broader 
field of Environmental Governance and International Environmental Politics and 
secondly the theoretical challenge of theorizing any form of Governance that 
addresses phenomenon that occur on a global scale. In order to make reasonable 
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sense of what characterizes Climate Governance theories one must first elucidate 
how theories approach Governance on the one hand and the specific phenomenon 
of Climate Change on the other. 
Governance can be viewed as distinct from Government in so far as 
Governance denotes the use of institutional power to shape processes and 
outcomes that does not exclusively involve states as actors but can rather include 
institutional and organizational entities that both transcend and are submerged 
beneath a state level. With respect to Environmental Governance in the broader 
sense a constructive definition is formulated as follows: 
 
“Environmental Governance is synonymous with interventions aiming at 
changes in environment-related incentives, knowledge, institutions, decision-
making, behaviors and identities.” (Lemos & Agarwal, 2009:71). 
 
However, Climate Change is a fundamentally global and trans-boundary 
problem and all theories that seek to address it are inevitably forced to theorize its 
globality as a constitutive element. Whilst theoretical approaches to Global 
Environmental Governance have originated in prior debates surrounding 
international environmental regimes and multilateral environmental agreements 
between states, it has since become a much more hybrid and complex 
phenomenon that invites several potential points of theoretical entry. For sake of 
parsimony the category of Global Governance (of which Global Environmental 
Governance is one) can however be theorized and defined in two distinct ways; 
one phenomenological and one normative (Biermann, 2006:239). A 
phenomenological approach to Global Governance simply describes the emerging 
phenomenon of governance forms and arrangements while normative approaches 
can either identify Global Governance as a kind of active substantive political 
orientation of policies that attempts to handle problems of modernity or can be 
used to criticize such orientations and seek to bring attention to their shortcomings 
(Ibid).  
Regardless of which point of departure is adopted there are clear indications 
that Global Environmental Governance has grown more and more complex and is 
fragmented into multiple political scales and domains, Climate Governance is here 
one of the most notable examples. This change can be attributable to globalization 
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as such but holds importance for the specific case of Climate Governance, since in 
many ways, it is the quintessential global problem par excellence (Lemos & 
Agarwal, 2009:90). Climate Governance is an emblematic case of how the study 
of Global Environmental Governance has turned from studies of 
intergovernmental regimes and single institutions to including an expanding 
terminology of “governance architectures” and “regime complexes” (Biermann & 
Pattberg, 2012)(Keohane&Victor, 2011). These theories tend to affirm the point 
of view that Global Governance is most properly exercised through the market, 
my interpretation of this claim being that it is the only institution that can assume 
a truly global scale. The degree to which Regime theory and the affiliated IR 
theoretical position of Neoliberal/institutional still enjoy theoretical primacy 
cannot be understated. Whilst the importance of institutions cannot be denied, a 
counterargument concerns the degree of independence that can be ascribed to 
institutions: 
 
“Understanding environmental problems and politics from the point at which 
they enter the remit of global institutions is to neglect the prior political and 
material relations that account for the production environmental harm.” (Newell, 
2012:34) 
 
What is critical for the purposes of this thesis is the question of whether the 
new and hybrid governance forms that have emerged in relation to climate change 
indicate a move away from traditional questions of power in international politics 
as it is typically described in mainstream IR theory. If Global Governance as such 
can be understood to describe the political change of institutional decision making 
in response to the phenomenon of globalization, in which increasing 
interdependence causes a shift in the locus of political authority to domains that 
transcend the parameters of a nation state and that therefore change the way that 
global politics actually takes place, it its pertinent to ask what then is the role of 
the state? On the one hand Global Environmental Governance and therefore by 
extension Climate Governance can be understood as inherently post-Westphalian 
in that it denotes institutions, regimes and agreements that transcend the 
international state system (Biermann, 2006:243). However, what is also important 
to note is that this does not mean that Global Environmental Governance can be 
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understood outside of the contexts of global politics. There is little basis for 
assuming any a-priori autonomy of either states, markets or societies (Newell, 
2012). With respect to Climate Change it is evidently not clear to what extent the 
new hybrid governance forms produced can actually address the phenomenon of 
Climate Change in separation from political economic constraints. Climate 
Governance is clearly not possible to differentiate completely from Climate 
Politics; 
 
“Climate governance cannot be understood as separate from the ideology, 
institutions and material interests that predominate within the wider global 
economy in which climate politics exist and with which it seeks to engage.” 
(Bulkeley & Newell, 2010:33). 
 
As a regulatory multilateral regime that is composed of sovereign state parties 
the UNFCCC, despite its scope and scale is still embedded in an international 
state system and global political economy, however it is ironically also the case 
that Climate Governance is a “meta-feature” of that system since there is no 
aspect of political or economic reality that does not affect, or is can be said to be 
affected by, the Climate (Bulkeley&Newell, 2010). The identification of this 
overlapping complexity constitutes a common understanding which by and large 
forms the basis for an International Political Economy theoretical approach to 
Climate Governance of which there are various types (including critical and neo-
gramscian) but can still be viewed as a somewhat coherent category.  
There may however be need for a parsimonious approach to the term Climate 
Governance due to the fact that global interdependence is equally present as a key 
factor in other aspects of international politics. The argument being that there 
should be a distinction between global governance and simply the study of 
international politics as within the field of International Relations theory 
(Biermann, 2006). I will now briefly refer to an account of the important 
challenges that Climate Change poses to IR theory and what theoretical 
consequences that it carries with it. Climate Change as a phenomenon presents a 
theoretical challenge for both neo-realism and neoliberal-institutionalist 
approaches to International Relations. This is especially true for the neorealist 
perspective's ontological grounding in global anarchy and treatment of states as 
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unitary actors, whose actions are determined to be the pursuit of relative gains 
(Paterson, 1996). Such a perspective is unable to account for the fact that a 
Climate Regime and entity such as the UNFCCC actually was formed at all. By 
contrast a neoliberal-institutional approach, that emphasizes the pursuit of 
absolute gains as derived from an affirmation of the possibility of cooperative 
behavior among states and the capacity of institutional forms such as a climate 
regime to create stable expectations and the conditions of possibility for such 
cooperation, is better suited to explain the creation of the UNFCCC (Ibid). A 
typical neoliberal-institutionalist account is however not capable of explaining the 
differentiation and variability of state's rationalities when faced with the question 
of how to cooperate and the variability of how states respond (Eckersley, 2010). 
More specifically, a constructivist critique of assumed state rationality in face of 
global anarchy is also a necessary theoretical element to incorporate in regard to 
the UNFCCC where states have acted both as role players as well as strict utility 
maximizers (Paterson, 1996). With respect to any regime it is impossible to 
approach it as a neutral and isolated entity that can be viewed as separate from the 
normative context in which it is immersed (Zelli et al, 2012). In regard to climate 
governance the context is heavily influenced by liberal governance norms that 
have greatly affected what governance architectures have emerged. This is 
especially clear in the rejection of trade restrictive policies and embracing of 
market mechanisms within the regime (Ibid).  
However, interestingly for the purposes of this thesis, it would appear that it is 
exactly the question of responsibility in the multilateral manifestations of Climate 
Governance as exemplified by the UNFCCC that has nonetheless changed the 
trajectory of international cooperation (Newell & Bulkeley, 2010:39). DCs 
insistence on the primacy of the CBDR principle is emblematic of a norm that has 
to a certain extent remained intact despite the dominant position of liberal 
governance. It has also indirectly spurned an increase in both bilateral and 
regional attempts at creating climate governance as a reaction to the obstacles 
within the UNFCCC and thus bringing into question the status of the multilateral 
process as well as raising the question of whether alternative governance forms 
such as minilateralism are more suitable to address the problem. I will return to 
address this later on in section 5.3. 
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In light of the challenges that have emerged during the UNFCCC's complicated 
path to the current negotiations and especially in light of the challenge in regard to 
how to elicit the engagement of the major emitting countries, it is obvious that the 
Climate Regime calls for further examination with regard to important norms such 
as responsibility and the category of equity in which it figures. While the 
UNFCCC as a framework convention obviously does not counteract the fact that 
the international system of states is an anarchic one, neither does this anarchy 
necessarily create a given outcome.  
Factors that can potentially affect outcomes of inter-state action are the norms 
that are present amongst actors and how they are subsequently interpreted 
(Paterson, 2006). Norms are however equally present in the context of Regimes 
themselves and critically do not only affect the institutions but also the inter-
linkages of institutions (Zelli et al, 2012). As mentioned previously liberal norms 
have constituted the basis from which the creation of market mechanisms have 
gained its legitimacy. This governance form has proven to be dominant. 
Furthermore the process of creation of such markets that operate as governance 
forms through governing via price; require prior governance outside of the market 
itself. Especially when markets are created to serve a purpose other than their own 
continuation and proliferation the question becomes what rationale informs that 
purpose (Newell&Paterson. 2010). One account identifies that this general 
phenomenon of the marketization of governance:  
 
 “..has occurred principally because of a structural feature of carbon markets 
as responses – that they created concentrated, immediate benefits for powerful 
actors – and the political dynamic which has resulted from this structural 
feature.” (Paterson, 2011:619) 
 
In the case of Climate Change and given the intentions of this thesis the 
question concerns how do liberal-market norms affect the conceptualization of 
responsibility in regards to DCs? Embedded in this question is a second one 
regarding the meaning and significance of how the new, hybrid and fragmented 
forms of climate governance actually relate to the role of the state in regard to 
climate change and to what extent the changes in governance forms actually 
supersede the theoretical understandings of international politics that are germane 
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to conventional IR theory. In order to make more sense of this I will now pursue a 
discussion regarding the role of the state in Climate Governance. 
5.1.1 The Role of The State 
With specific respect to Climate Change it is evident that there are two tendencies 
within attempts to approach it theoretically. On the one hand Climate Change 
poses unique challenges for more conventional theories of International Relations 
in so far as the statist orientation of these is incommensurable with the globalized 
nature of the problem (Paterson, 1996)(Stripple, 2005)(Paterson & Stripple, 
2007). On the other hand negotiations within the main multilateral and regulatory 
entity of the Climate Regime that is supposed to facilitate cooperation and the 
seeking of absolute gains, namely the UNFCCC, has encountered multiple 
challenges and obstacles.  
For some this would indicate that the sovereign, territorially bound state is still 
an important and basic unit of analysis that can explain the outcomes and 
trajectory of climate politics (Compagnon et al, 2012). Furthermore it stands to 
reason that while the Climate Regime as manifested in the UNFCCC may be 
regarded as an example of a form of Global Governance in that it occupies a space 
“above” sovereign states, it is however not a Global Government and is to a 
certain degree only the sum of its member-states, which are unavoidably 
sovereign (Wapner, 1998). While the modern westphalian western state may be 
viewed as being embedded in a euro-centric 19
th
 century experience, it can also be 
said that Global Governance is based on the experiences of countries that are 
members of the OECD, and so from the perspective of DCs on may conclude that 
Global Governance tends to hold a different meaning that what is usually assumed 
(Compagnon et al, 2012).  
Bearing this in mind, the identification of Climate Governance as a concept 
which shifts according to interpretations; that can, in one extreme denote a 
pragmatically informed political program seeking to remediate the problems that 
occur in a globalized society or on the other extreme describe a particular, 
geographically specific mode of policy formation that implicitly verifies a 
neoliberal hegemony, seems to be accurate. This would confirm that Climate 
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Governance as it is interpreted is a normative category and must be approached 
through acknowledging its essentially constructed nature.  
On the other hand there is very clear indication the modern state as such is 
equally a constructed category and that it is primarily the territorialized grounding 
of sovereign states that renders the problem of climate change such a theoretical 
conundrum (Stripple, 2005)(Paterson&Stripple, 2007). Territoriality is thus a 
fundamental ontological category that provides the condition of possibility and 
basis for the majority of theoretical perspectives on climate change as well as 
underlying how the problem is addressed within global political arenas: 
 
“Since the territorial configurations of political space are made to appear 
natural certain political and economic solutions to the climate issue becomes 
legitimized.” (Paterson&Stripple, 2007:150) 
 
With regard to responsibility this territorialized grounding is especially 
pertinent. Responsibility as a conceptual element within the question of “burden-
sharing” is embedded and nestled within a language that relates exclusively to 
states (Stripple, 2005). The question of how to interpret the CBDR principle for 
instance is still enclosed in a political language that affirms the primacy of 
sovereign states (Ibid).  Bearing this discussion in mind I will now proceed and 
elaborate briefly on the question of responsibility in Climate Governance with 
particular attention two key aspects of the question of responsibility that have 
emerged in connection to contentions within the UNFCCC negotiations and which 
be shown to broadly differentiate between two theoretical perspectives on climate 
governance. 
5.2 Responsibility in Climate Governance 
It should be stated that the question of responsibility is cemented within a much 
broader conceptual area of equity, fairness and justice, which I have no intention 
of making an exhaustive account of. Suffice it to say that in order to discuss 
responsibility it is necessary to qualify what aspect of climate change it can refer 
to and to characterize its relationship to more general norms of justice. Being that 
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as it may, with respect to the question of responsibility in Climate Governance I 
will focus on two of the themes that I have previously extrapolated from my 
review of the academic literature on the CBDR principle. These two themes 
concern the ambiguity of the Nature of Responsibilities and how the relationship 
between Climate and Development is considered. 
5.2.1 The Nature of Responsibilities 
 
What introduces the question of Responsibility inter alia in the case of Climate 
Change is a fundamental asymmetry between cause and effect. The cause of the 
problem is both local-cumulative and trans-boundary in nature and as is 
sometimes stated the climate pays no attention whatsoever to where the carbon is 
emitted. The effects however are another matter entirely, and furthermore as will 
be seen, when concerned with normative concepts such a responsibility the 
question of where and in conjunction with which processes emissions occur is of 
critical importance. That being said, these asymmetries are addressed in different 
ways and with differing results regarding how responsibilities can be described. 
One ambiguity regarding the nature of responsibilities can be derived from 
differing emphasis on capability or culpability which is in turn dependent on 
contentions concerning more general equity norms that have been present from 
the outset of the UNFCCC (Okerere, 2008).  
For the purposes of this thesis and very generally speaking these contentions in 
the negotiations revolve around approaches to distributive questions. Within the 
question of distribution lies the question of allocation that refers to either between 
countries or over time (Vanderheiden, 2008). I will not refer to the complex inter-
linkages between these two or to the linkages between adaptation and mitigation 
but will focus entirely on the question of inter-generational equity and mitigation. 
The complex debate between international and cosmopolitan justice however, is 
simply too extensive to include in this thesis. 
In the case of mitigation there are two basic distributive issues in play; the 
question of distribution of abatement costs and of emission rights (Grubb, 1995). 
Both of these issues pertain to the question of how to allocate future emissions 
and in absence of separate transfers that are associated with abatement the choice 
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of allocation approach will impact heavily on the cost, meaning that if not 
addressed through policy concerning financial support from ICs to DCs the cost of 
abatement is directly dependent on the distribution of emission constraints/rights 
(Ibid). The alternative to transfers is tradable permits that have proved to be the 
preferred method in ex. the Kyoto Protocol. The distinction between the allocation 
of abatement costs and of emission rights can also be described as that between 
“burden-sharing” meaning the allocation of abatement and “resource-sharing” 
meaning the allocation of emission rights. What is common to all is that the 
question of responsibility revolves around the assigning of responsibility to pay 
(Baer, 2011). 
Very broadly speaking approaches can take the form of an egalitarian, 
utilitarian, entitlement approach or as departed from a responsibility principle that 
ascribes culpability associated with “the polluter pays” principles such as through 
the accounting of emissions based on “historical responsibility” 
(Parks&Timmons-Roberts,2009). The egalitarian approach associates with a per 
capita approach however may conceal intra-state inequity if not weighted in 
relation to income distribution, which is often raised by governance theories that 
emphasize global and intra-state inequality (Parks&Timmons-Roberts, 2006). In 
association to this egalitarian approaches departing from a cosmopolitanism that 
relates to  a discussion on the difference between “luxury” and “survival” 
emissions explore the possibility of introducing the differentiation of 
responsibilities within states including large DCs (Harris, 2011)(Harris, 2012). 
5.2.2 Climate and Development 
From the perspective of Developing Countries, a unifying discourse that is 
grounded in The Right to Development is a fundamental aspect of how the 
question of Climate Change is approached (Najam, 2004). There are two sides to 
how Development and Climate relate from the perspective of the South (The 
South in the context of the UNFCCC is composed to 95% of G77). On the one 
hand Climate Change poses a real and substantial threat to development in many 
countries, on the other hand DCs are also apprehensive of the possibility that 
actions and policies that aim to address Climate Change can potentially also pose 
such a threat (Kartha, 2011:505). 
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To fully appreciate the dilemma facing DCs, the above figure supplied by Kartha 
2011:505 depicts a best possible scenario in which in order to keep warming 
under 2 degrees Celsius global annual emissions peak before 2015 and are 
reduced below 85% of 1990 levels by 2050, and Kartha, 2011 emphasizes that 
this represents a very ambitious globally coordinated mobilization. The black line 
here represents global emissions. ‘ 
In regard to ICs or Annex 1 countries the figure shows a very ambitious 
trajectory, starting immediately emissions would be reduced at more than 5 % 
annually, falling below 40% by 2020 and by 90% in 2050. Kartha states that this 
trajectory actually corresponds to demands made by many DCs. IC emissions are 
here represented by the dashed line. Through subtracting IC emissions trajectory 
from global emissions trajectory the other the dotted line in the middle shows the 
“emissions” space that would remain for DCs.  
This shows that for DCs the peak in emissions would occur only a few years 
later than ICs, and also before 2020 all the while realizing their development and 
poverty eradication goals (Kartha, 2011:505). In light of the fact that development 
in ICs has been largely made possible through the emissions of GHGs, the DC 
position is grounded in an apprehension that climate stabilization can potentially 
mean a loss of access to development and that a climate regime may create a 
fundamental tradeoff between development and climate.  
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With respect to the negotiations within the UNFCCC, Kartha, 2011 points out that 
the DCs staunch stances on the right to sustainable development is informed by an 
experience that is based in the acknowledgement of “a non-negotiable foundation 
of greenhouse-age geopolitical realism.” due to the fact that Sustainable 
Development represents the only way to reduce the cost of abatement in relation 
to the cost of not abating (Kartha, 2011:507). While the previously mentioned an 
equal per capita approach to allocation is based on an egalitarian concept of equity 
(Parks & Timmons-Roberts, 2009) The notion of historical responsibility 
regularly invoked by DCs introduces an affirmation of the culpability aspect of 
responsibility in contrast to capability. In order to make sense of the DC position 
the following figure (also supplied by Kartha, 2011) can prove constructive: 
The figure represents the sharing of the total amount of carbon space if warming 
is to be constrained at below 2 degrees. Starting during the beginning of 
industrialization in 1850 and ending in 2050 the allocation of the emissions 
budget is as follows: the striped area represents IC emissions (720GtC02), while 
the black area represents ICs per capita share (430GtC02). The white area 
represents DC emissions (770GtC02). The per capita share of DCs would be the 
white plus the striped area (1490GtC02) (Kartha, 2011).  
This view of historic responsibility from the perspective of DCs is also greatly 
compounded by considering that the first 1/3 of the carbon budget took 130 years 
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to spend and the 2/3 took 20 years (Kartha, 2011). This figure sufficiently sums 
up the rationale behind the concept of historical responsibility and carbon debt, 
especially considering the fact that C02 can remain in the atmosphere for a 
hundred years (Vanderheiden, 2008). 
Despite this concept of “debt” the actual DC demands do not refer to 
compensatory payment but rather center in on a conditional demand for IC 
leadership and the provision of financial and technological support and transfers. 
These conditionalities are articulated in the UNFCCC Convention in amongst 
others Article 4.1b-c and Article 4.3 which also constitutes an important reason 
for why DCs are so adamant about retaining the integrity of the multilateral 
regime. I will now conclude this chapter with a section that theoretically 
conceives of two Climate Governance types with respect to how they differentiate 
in regard to the two aforementioned responsibility aspects as well as introducing a 
contemporary debate that exemplifies how these types can be understood to relate 
explicitly to key Policy Documents which I will analyze in Chapter 6. 
5.3 Climate Governance, Developing Country 
Responsibility and Minilateralism 
In this last section I will first reiterate some of the initial discussions regarding the 
challenge of demarcating Climate Governance theories. I will then exemplify how 
two IR theory approaches are represented in a contemporary climate governance 
theory debate concerning minilateralism. Lastly I will conclude with displaying an 
ideal type model in which these two approaches are differentiated according to the 
aspects previously analyzed in this chapter. 
When attempting to excise demarcated types of Climate Governance theory 
from engaging with the literature it has become exceedingly clear that the field is 
considerably more fraught with complexity than that of more typical IR theory. To 
reiterate the beginnings of section 5.1 Climate Governance theory doesn’t 
necessarily adopt clear substantive stance a when approaching the task of 
theorizing how the Governance of Climate Change is manifested. However there 
are clear differences in the approach to Climate Governance taken by Green 
Critical International Political Economy IR theories and some Normative 
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Cosmopolitan theories on the one hand and more mainstream Neoliberal 
Institutional IR theories on the other. These differences are most clearly indicated 
in regard to their differing understanding of the interaction between the global 
economy and environment but most fundamentally in their understanding state 
rationalities. Following the earlier discussion of the role of the state that was 
addressed briefly in section 5.1.1 and which indicates its importance in regard to 
the question of responsibility, it can be added that what has been revealed as 
underlying the clashes in negotiations on the post 2012 period is that the ethical 
issues including responsibility is that International Relations as well as Climate 
Governance are directly concerned with how human life is organized 
(Paterson&Stripple, 2007).  This is not sufficient in itself to constitute the 
differentiating axis along which to align distinct types. I have therefore chosen to 
instead indicate the differences that I believe are relevant through selecting a 
contemporary theoretical debate. This debate concerns the future composition of 
the Climate Regime and to what extent it should retain its multilateral form, or 
whether the problem of what form of governance that is more conducive to 
Climate Change will ultimately be answered by minilateralism. As first hinted in 
chapter 2 the post 2012 period of climate governance has seen a questioning of the 
efficacy of the UN based framework approach of the UNFCCC 
(Bäckstrand&Lövbrand, 2007). This connects directly to the question of DC 
responsibility in so far as the inevitability of future DC mitigation came into play. 
Minilateralism has thus figured as a concept referring to the possibility of 
restructuring the Climate Regime.  
The Neoliberal Institutional IR position is based on the conclusion that the 
climate regime is so fragmented that it is rather a “Regime Complex” and that due 
to structural diversity amongst actors as well as asymmetrical power and interests, 
efforts to rebuild a comprehensive regime are likely to fail (Keohane&Victor, 
2011). While equity and “fairness” norms are important in so far as they inform 
states interests, if too disparate amongst actors they will hinder cooperation. What 
this position does conclude is that regime complexes in that include spheres with 
balanced interests can in contrast facilitate working agreements (Young, 2011). 
Examples of these include the Asia Pacific Partnership, the Major Economies 
Forum on Energy and Climate or the G20 or G8 (Cole, 2011) (Keohane&Victor, 
2011).   
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The Critical Green IPE position IR position by contrast, while acknowledging the 
problems raised by the Neoliberal-Institutionalists, attach more importance to 
normative and justice related aspects of the problem in the Regime. The UNFCCC 
in its current form in which the differential treatment for DCs is a constitutional 
element is identified as “Affirmative Multilateralism” (Eckersley, 2010).  
Although this position identifies the problems given the current regime it 
regards legitimacy aspects as key and advances an argument that asymmetric 
principles can actually be incorporated into agreements in ways that reflect justice 
and legitimacy concerns (Eckersley,2012). While not ceding ground entirely to 
problem of regime fragmentation proposals nonetheless gravitate towards 
recasting the regime architecture in the form of an composition with either a form 
of “Inclusive Minilateralism” such as a Climate Council within the UNFCCC that 
is based on the principle of “Common But Differentiated Representation” 
(Eckersley, 2010:26) or on an emulation of the G20 in a leadership group within 
the UNFCCC (Huang, 2009). The key differences between these two positions 
concern the degree to which the UNFCCC as an entity is considered a reliable and 
capable regime that can actually reach an agreement. 
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5.3.1 Ideal Types 
 
The model on the next page represents an ideal-typology of climate governance 
theories according to their differentiation in relation how they conceptualize the 
nature of responsibilities and the relationship between climate and development as 
well as how they respond to the question of the future composition of the climate  
regime with regard to the concept of minilateralism. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Climate Governance 
Theory 
Responsibility 
Aspect 
Neoliberal 
Institutionalism  
Some Cosmopolitan 
Normative/ Green IPE/Critical/ 
Nature of 
Responsibility 
Entitlement through 
trade. Responsibility is 
about Capabilities. 
Regards states as units 
of responsibility    
 
Egalitarian Per capita but also 
with respect to intra-state. Per 
capita accounting but adapted 
for ability to pay intra-state. 
Combined Capability and 
Culpability 
Climate and 
Development 
Climate and 
Development 
resolvable through 
mainly market 
governance. Equity 
and responsibility 
effectiveness issue. 
 
Climate and Development 
requires major change. Not 
only question of regime 
efficiency but also about 
inequality in global economy 
and states 
Minilateralism/Regime 
Composition? 
Regime Complex 
effective due to 
symmetry of interests. 
Regime restructured 
more effective, more 
probable outside of 
UNFCCC. 
Inclusive Minilateralism/ 
Common but Differentiated 
Participation. Legitimacy and 
Justice important and possible 
through restructuring regime 
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6 Analysis of Policy Documents 
 
In the following chapter I will describe and analyze documents from the 
contemporary UNFCCC negotiations. I will then introduce the documents by way 
of a paper trail that will explain which subsidiary body in the negotiations that 
they originate in as well as which workstream that they are part of. I will then 
select and report their content based on its relevance in regard to the aspects of 
responsibility previously delineated as well as in regards to the question of regime 
composition. I will then present how, in light of previous chapters their content 
may be understood and then conclude by presenting the contents of these 
documents in an ideal type model. 
6.1 The Paper Trail 
During the COP 17 in December 2011, The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action 
was adopted which included the launching of a process to develop a “protocol, 
another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the 
Convention applicable to all Parties” (FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 Dec1, Paragr 2). 
This process was to be developed through the establishment of a subsidiary body 
under the Convention called The Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform 
for Enhanced Action (AWG-ADP) and the deadline set for an agreement by 2015 
to be implemented by 2020. At its first session in Bonn 2012 the AWG-ADP 
adopted its agenda and initiated two workstreams, one addressing matters related 
to paragraphs 2–6 of decision 1/CP.17 (see Appendix two)  and another 
addressing matters related to paragraphs 7–8 of the same decision 
(FCCC/ADP/2012/2). It is the first of these workstreams, which is the focus of the 
documents that I have selected for this thesis.  
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The AWG-ADP later met in an informal session in Bangkok, Thailand between 
30 august and 5 September of 2012 during which parties held discussions under 
amongst others the rubrique “Visions and aspirations for the ADP”. In preparation 
for this discussion the co-chairs presented the parties with a number of questions 
that would form the basis for the discussion, for example “How do Parties 
understand the term ‘applicable to all’? (see Appendix one for a complete list of 
questions). 
These discussions were later summarized during the second part of the first 
session of the AWG-ADP that was held in conjunction with COP 18 in Doha. 
During this meeting the parties agreed to hold three further roundtable discussions 
based on upcoming challenges and on four issues identified by the co-chairs as 
holding an interest for parties to discuss, for instance “How the principles of the 
Convention will be applied in the new agreement” (see Appendix One for a 
complete list of questions). 
During the second part of its first session the AWG-ADP decided to hold more 
in-session roundtable discussions and workshops in 2013 and also “invited Parties 
as well as accredited observer organizations to submit to the secretariat by 1 
March 2013, information, views and proposals on matters related to the work of 
the ADP, including, inter alia, mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology 
development and transfer, capacity-building, and transparency of action and 
support addressing a number of issues: [see Appendix One for a complete list of 
issues]”(FCCC/ADP/2012/3) 
The documents that I am analyzing in this chapter are submissions from the 
parties China and India to the ADP in response to the aforementioned requests. 
6.2 Report on Content 
 
The following is a report on content in the submissions to the ADP from China 
and India. The following represents my selection of the most pertinent content of 
the documents, given the aim of this thesis. The original documents can be found 
in Appendix 3 and 4 respectively. 
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6.2.1 Submission by China to the ADP 
China begins by clarifying that the Durban Platform’s objective, principles and 
basis are inseparable from the multilateralism of the Convention. China further 
clarifies that both process and outcome of the Durban Platform should be in 
accordance with the Conventions principles, especially equity and common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and moreover that “The 
dichotomy between developed and developing countries is the very foundation of 
the Convention regime”. China continues to add that any attempts to modify the 
categorization of countries in regards to their Annexes will delay progress. 
China goes on to state that:  
 
“The outcome of Durban Platform process shall be `applicable to all parties´ 
in the same manner as the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol, which shall by 
no means suggest or imply uniformity of responsibilities and obligations for 
all parties in terms of nature, content and magnitude. The outcome shall 
define the differentiated responsibilities between developed and developing 
countries, reflect the historical responsibilities of developed countries and 
giving full consideration to the development stages and respective 
capabilities of developing countries, bearing in mind that social economic 
development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities 
for developing countries”. 
 
China also addresses Post-2020 Enhanced Actions emphasizes they should 
“comprehensively implement the provisions of the Convention, covering 
mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer and capacity 
building.” China goes on to emphasize that the agreement on the post 2020 
enhanced actions should “define the differentiated commitments and actions for 
developed and developing countries in full accordance with the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities.” 
With respect to mitigation for Developing Countries China states that it: 
 
“..will take diversified enhanced mitigation actions in the context of 
sustainable development, consistent with their national circumstances and 
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supported and enabled by adequate finance, technology and capacity 
building support from developed countries.” 
 
In connection to this China emphasizes Art.4.7 of the UNFCCC as well as stating 
that in regards to transfer they should mainly come from public funds. With 
respect to Pre-2020 ambition, China states that all actions should be “guided by 
the objective and principles of the Convention” regardless of whether they are 
taken under the Convention or outside it. Furthermore China states that Developed 
countries “shall commit to reducing their emissions of greenhouse gases in 
aggregate by at least 25%-40% below their 1990 levels by 2020.” and goes on to 
state that those developed countries that will undertake commitment for the 2
nd
 
term under the Kyoto Protocol “shall revisit and raise their mitigation ambition by 
2014 at the latest.” In addition China states that those developed countries that are 
not part of a 2
nd
 period “shall undertake comparable mitigation commitments 
under the Convention. Moreover China states that Developed countries should 
increase their mitigation ambition mainly through domestic efforts.  
China concludes by stating in regard to developing countries ambition that 
“developing countries have already presented ambitious nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions and their contribution to global mitigation efforts is far greater 
than that by developed countries.”  Furthermore China declares that for 
developing countries “any activities, no matter whether they are taken within or 
outside the framework of the Convention, are part of their efforts to implement 
their nationally appropriate mitigation actions that have been presented” and that 
“any international cooperative initiatives may facilitate the implementation by 
developing countries of their presented actions, but shall not introduce any new or 
additional commitments for developing countries.” 
6.2.2 Submission by India to the ADP 
India states that the including of “under the Convention” in the Durban Platform 
implies “consistency with, adherence to, and reflection of all the principles and 
provisions of the Convention, with no reinterpretation of the Convention, neither 
of its principles nor its Annexes.” Thus India concludes that an agreement reached 
in the ADP ” may not in any way, explicit or implicit” change the content of the 
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Convention.  India states this especially in regard to equity and CBDR, which are 
implicitly reaffirmed by the phrase “under the Convention”.  
India goes on to say that the necessity of basing any outcome on the Durban 
Platform on “duly incorporate requirements of common but differentiated 
responsibilities” concerns not only the common goal of climate stabilization but 
also “to ensure that the goal of social and economic development and poverty 
eradication in developing countries is not compromised.” Moreover India states 
that: 
 
“The actions and commitments of Parties in the post 2020 period must be 
differentiated on the basis of equity in terms of historical responsibilities and the 
fundamental imperatives of social and economic development and poverty 
eradication.” 
 
Furthermore, India states that the phrase “applicable to all Parties” does not mean 
a change in differentiation. India declares that the way responsibilities are 
established in the Convention should remain - “Universality of application does 
not translate into uniformity of application”. Lastly India emphasizes the 
importance of avoiding “unilateral measures” and that Parties should ensure these 
“are not allowed to damage the spirit of multilateralism.” 
In regard to how the ADP should build on experiences from other processes 
under the Convention, India states that the Durban Platform is based on the 
understanding that “fulfilling the ultimate objective of the Convention will require 
strengthening the multilateral, rules-based regime under the Convention.” India 
goes on to say that at the Doha COP, parties recognized the importance of the 
Kyoto Protocol and its accordance with equity and CBDR and that: “ADP must 
therefore build on the model of Kyoto Protocol.”  
India goes on to emphasize the distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I 
parties to the Convention and that any other approach to mitigation would mean 
that the principles of the convention would not be maintained. In regard to the 
question of ways of defining and reflecting enhanced action, India states that 
enhanced action under the Convention should be based on CBDR and the 
“provision of finance, technology and capacity building to developing countries in 
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order to support their mitigation and adaptation actions under the Convention and 
take into account the imperatives of equitable access to sustainable development.” 
India concludes by stating that in order to encourage broader participation 
“there has to an assurance on how to an assurance on how the principles of the 
Convention are applied, that the social and economic and developmental 
imperative will be respected, multilateral rules are fully respected and that threat 
or use of unilateral actions, particularly against developing countries are 
permanently removed.” (sic) 
6.2.3 Ideal Type Analysis of Policy Documents 
I will categorize the content of these two documents as following what emerges 
when examining how they relate to the two aspects of responsibility as previously 
stated. 
 
Nature of Responsibilities 
Both India and China make continuous reference to the unquestionable primacy of 
the CBDR principle and that this should by no means be changed in any future 
climate agreement. Both countries assume a staunch opposition to a view of 
“uniformity” regarding the nature of responsibilities and they both refer to the 
historic responsibility of ICs and that the differentiation and categorization that is 
derived from the CBDR principle remains the fundamental basis of the entire 
UNFCCC. This is not surprising and rather confirms the findings of chapter 2. 
This would confirm that both countries remain adhering to a fundamental 
acknowledgement of the Culpability inherent in the CBDR principle. China also 
declares that the mitigation that it already has taken is far more ambitious than 
that of ICs and in its statement seems to adhere to a strong sovereign 
interpretation regarding it right to interpret its own actions as always 
commensurate with the UNFCCC regardless if its commitments occur outside of 
the negotiations.  
 
Climate and Development 
Both countries make continual reference to the conditionality inherent in the 
UNFCCC and that responsibility as a concept is embedded within the question of 
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equitable access to Sustainable Development. Both countries also consider the 
acknowledgement of the right to development and poverty eradication for DCs as 
greatly influencing any future negotiations. Interestingly China emphasizes the 
need for that transfers of financial and technical support for implementation 
should come mainly from public funds.  
 
Regime Composition 
Both countries affirm the importance of multilateralism and the 
comprehensiveness of the continued negotiations on the question of a new 
agreement in regard to both procedural and substantive elements. Both countries 
state several reiterations that no new agreement should rearticulate the Convention 
with a strong emphasis on rule-based multilateralism. India especially declares 
that any unilateral action should be avoided and any such proposals should be 
removed.  
 
The following figure represents a fitting of the content of the two policy 
documents that were selected as part of the ideal type model as previously created: 
 
 
Responsibility 
Aspect 
Large DCs (Ex China & 
India)  
Nature of 
Responsibility 
No uniformity. CBDR as 
Culpability Historical  
Strong emphasis distinction 
between Developing and 
Industrialized. Sovereignty  
 
Development and 
Climate 
Climate conditional on 
Development Sustainable 
Development only solution. 
Responsibility as in CBDR 
part of Sustainable 
Development 
Minilateralism? Retain affirmative 
multilateralism. 
New deal should not 
reformulate Convention.  
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7 Conclusions 
In this final chapter I will begin by displaying both ideal type models as derived 
from previous chapters in conjunction. I will then comment on correspondences 
within the model. I will then reconnect to the research questions as formulated in 
the end of chapter 2 and on what conclusions can be drawn from this.  
Climate Governance 
Theory / DCs 
Responsibility 
Aspect 
Neoliberal 
Institutionalism  
Some Cosmopolitan 
Normative/Green 
IPE/Critical/ 
Large DCs: China & 
India 
Nature of Responsibility Entitlement 
through trade 
Emphasizes. 
Responsibility is 
about Capabilities. 
Regards states as 
basis of 
responsibility    
 
Egalitarian Per capita 
but also with respect to 
intra-state. Per capita 
accounting but adapted 
for ability to pay intra-
state. Combined 
Capability and 
Culpability 
No uniformity. CBDR as 
Culpability Historical  
Strong emphasis 
distinction between 
Developing and 
Industrialized. Strong 
Sovereignty 
 
Climate and Development Climate and 
Development 
resolvable through 
mainly market 
governance. Equity 
and responsibility 
effectiveness issue. 
 
Climate and 
Development requires 
major change. Not only 
question of regime 
efficiency but also about 
inequality in global 
economy and states.  
Climate conditional on 
Development 
Sustainable 
Development only 
solution. Responsibility 
as in CBDR integral part 
of Sustainable 
Development 
Minilateralism/Regime 
Composition? 
Regime 
Complex effective 
due to symmetry of 
interests. Regime 
restructured more 
effective, more 
probable outside of 
UNFCCC.  
Inclusive 
Minilateralism/ 
Common but 
Differentiated 
Participation. 
Legitimacy and Justice 
important and possible 
through restructuring 
Retain affirmative 
multilateralism. 
New deal should not 
reformulate Convention. 
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7.1 Ideal-Type model in Conjunction 
7.2 Correspondences 
At first glance there appear to be very few correspondences. Many of the formerly 
noted differences that appeared in Chapter 2 are reproduced. Although the 
differences between conceptualizations are clear between both theories as well as 
with respect to the policy documents, one may be able to identify subtle 
similarities.  
Regarding the first row following Nature of Responsibility one may note that 
while Neoliberal Institutionalism from Capabilities and DCs from Culpability 
both consider the state to be the unit to which responsibility can be assigned. 
While some Cosmopolitan and Green IPE or Critical theories view an important 
consideration to include differentiation of responsibilities within states they depart 
from acknowledging both Culpability and Capability. 
The second row following Climate and Development indicates a similarity 
between Green IPE and Critical theories with DCs in so far that they both 
consider that for the possible Climate Development tradeoff to be avoided 
requires substantial change either via addressing questions of both inter- and intra-
national justice or through a fundamental change within the context of Sustainable 
Development. 
The last row represents to some extent the most relevant since it concerns how 
the previous differences are addressed in terms of whether the multilateral process 
under the Convention is believed to be able succeed given its current composition. 
Here it is rather the climate governance theories that while proposing different 
solutions still share the view that the Convention requires restructuring in contrast 
regime  
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to how the DC position which considers any other attempt at any change to the 
principle elements concerning the IC-DC differentiations fundamentally, 
unacceptable. 
7.3 Final Conclusions 
My research question in this thesis concerned whether the way in which large 
Developing Countries conceptualized their responsibilities for mitigation 
corresponded to how theories of climate governance conceptualized DC 
responsibilities for mitigation. As indicated in the previous section, there were no 
obvious correspondences between either theories or between theories and in terms 
of how they conceptualized DC responsibility for mitigation.  
However some subtle similarities were found concerning the role of the state as 
well as what was considered to be necessary in order to address the Climate –
Development relationship. In addition the question of the composition of the 
climate regime was shown to have an indirect connection to the question of how 
DC responsibility is conceptualized. The two aspects of DC responsibility through 
which I chose to operationalize the concept were revealed to be deeply 
intertwined from the perspective of DCs themselves, which confirmed the 
thematic findings of Chapter 2. Although this was by no means a surprise, it was 
revealing how strongly concomitant the two aspects were as expressed in the 
policy documents. In terms of how norms are constitutive of worldviews, this fact 
in itself was a clear indication and a verification of the utility of employing a 
Constructivist informed approach. Climate governance theories by contrast proved 
to be considerably less composite both in regard to how they conceptualized the 
two aspects of DC responsibility but also in regard to their basic theoretical 
orientations and points of departure.  
One observation is that the relations between climate governance theories were 
revealed to be less malleable in regards to strict differentiation in comparison with 
the more conventional IR theories from which they stem, at least from the 
perspective of this author. It would seem that on the one hand the profound 
conditions of interdependence that are engrained within a global phenomenon 
such as Climate Change preclude even the possibility of approaching it with a 
  44 
consistent theoretical task at hand. Perhaps the intricate complexity apparent in 
the many theoretical orientations are an indication that global governance as a 
concept and phenomenon is irreversibly altered by the changes that are occurring 
in our planet’s climate system and that this shift requires a rethinking of 
fundamental categories. I would conclude that some of the researchers cited in this 
thesis definitely provide constructive attempts to do so but that the sheer enormity 
of the issue means that at least for now the only theoretical language available that 
can attempt a full description based on any kind of notion of “verstehen” is still 
that of International Relations Theory. I interpret this to indicate that climate 
governance is a concept that is inseparable from climate politics.  
In regards to my stated aims it is clear that a mere description such as this is 
more than likely not sufficient in itself to provide the basis for any new, distinct or 
comprehensive future analytical engagement with the question of Developing 
Countries and Climate governance. Nonetheless the two broad theoretical types 
that I have identified and the subtle similarities in regard to the correspondences 
described may perhaps be of some use. With respect to matters concerning 
validity that were addressed in Chapter 3, and bearing in mind that I have not 
attempted to infer any causal relationship regarding the correspondence that I have 
described but simply attempted to, as per the stated aims, produce a useful 
descriptive account, I can only hope that it proves to be just that.   
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8 Appendixes 
8.1 Appendix 1 Instructions to the members of 
the ”Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban 
Platform for Enhanced Action” on three different 
occasions  
At an informal session in Bangkok, Thailand between 30 august and 5 September 
of 2012 . In preparation for this discussion the co-chairs presented the parties with 
the following questions that would form the basis for the discussion:  
“(a) What is your vision for the main contours and elements of the results of the work of the 
ADP? 
(b) What work is needed between now and 2015, and in particular in 2013, to achieve these 
results? 
(c) What do Parties mean by ‘national circumstances’? How could ‘national circumstances’ be 
accommodated in the results of the work of the ADP? 
(d) How do Parties understand the term ‘applicable to all’? 
(e) How can broader participation be encouraged and ensured? 
(f) How could “flexibility” be incorporated in the results of the work of the ADP? 
(g) How should the principles of the Convention be applied in the context of Parties’ vision for 
the ADP and the results of this workstream? “  
 
(Summary of roundtable on workstream 1 –Note by the Co-Chairs, 26th September 2012) 
 
 
Second part of the first session that was held in conjunction with COP 18 in Doha. 
During this meeting the parties agreed to hold three further roundtable discussions 
based on upcoming challenges and on four issues identified by the co-chairs as 
holding an interest for parties to discuss: 
“(a) How the principles of the Convention will be applied in the new agreement;  
(b) How national circumstances and changes thereof should be taken into account;  
(c) How the new agreement will be “applicable to all” in practice, including approaches to 
defining differentiated commitments;  
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(d) Ways to incentivize full and ambitious participation and ensure effective implementation and 
compliance arrangements.”  
(ADP.2012.6.InformalSummary) 
 
During the continuing in-session of the second part of the first session the AWG-
ADP decided to hold more in-session roundtable discussions and workshops in 
2013 and also “invited Parties as well as accredited observer organizations to 
submit to the secretariat by 1 March 2013, information, views and proposals on 
matters related to the work of the ADP, including, inter alia, mitigation, 
adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity-building, and 
transparency of action and support addressing such as the following: 
A) Application of the principles of the Convention; 
B) Building on the experiences and lessons learned from other processes under the 
Convention and from other multilateral processes, as appropriate; 
C) The scope, structure and design of the 2015 agreement; 
D) Ways of defining and reflecting enhanced action.” 
 (FCCC/ADP/2012/3 Paragraph 29) 
8.2 Appendix 2 Decision1/CP.17 
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